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INAPPROPRIATE RENDERINGS: THE
DANGER OF REDUCTIONIST RESOLUTIONS
John Cerone*
INTRODUCTION

I

n September 2007, major international news outlets reported that
“al-Qaeda in Iraq” had offered a reward for the murder of a Swedish
cartoonist who had drawn the Prophet Muhammad’s head on a dog’s
body.1 Western media cast the incident as an assault on the freedom of
expression launched by religiously motivated fanatics, as has been the
pattern in reporting recent similar incidents. A stark contrast is portrayed
between the open rational discourse that Western media see themselves
as fostering on the one side and those who claim that their belief systems
demand suppression of any expression they find blasphemous or otherwise unacceptably offensive on the other.
Since the Danish cartoon controversy first grabbed the international
spotlight in early 2006,2 the media has reported on hostile or anticipated
hostile responses from Muslim individuals and groups to various forms
of expression, including a speech by Pope Benedict,3 the honoring of
Salman Rushdie,4 and the cancellation of a German opera due to security
* Associate Professor of Law & Director of the Center for International Law &
Policy, New England School of Law. The Author was a Fulbright Guest Professor at the
Danish Institute for Human Rights in 2004. This Article is based on remarks delivered at
a panel discussion at the Palais des Nations during the inaugural session of the Human
Rights Council in June 2006. The Author would like to thank Angela Davis, Sandy
Lamar, Sarah Salter, and Barry Stearns for editorial assistance.
1. See, e.g., Bounty Set Over Prophet Cartoon, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6996553.stm; Louise Nordstrom, Artist Displays
Muhammad Cartoon Despite Al-Qaida Threat; Leader of Terror Group Offers Reward
for Killing Vilks, Paper’s Editor, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 19, 2007, at 35. For further background on the Danish cartoon controversy, see John Cerone, The Danish Cartoon Controversy & the International Regulation of Expression, ASIL INSIGHT, Feb. 7, 2006,
http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/02/insights060207.html.
2. The Danish cartoon controversy stems from the September 30, 2005 issue of Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper. This issue contained an article entitled Muhammeds
Ansigt (The Face of Mohammed), and it was accompanied by twelve cartoons depicting
the prophet Mohammed in various fashions. Flemming Rose, Muhammeds ansigt [The
Face of Mohammed], JYLLANDS-POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, at KulturWeekend 3.
This publication outraged both Muslim and non-Muslim communities worldwide. See
also Stéphanie Lagoutte, The Cartoon Controversy in Context: Analyzing the Decision
Not to Prosecute Under Danish Law, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 379, 381 (2008).
3. Muslim Anger Grows at Pope Speech, BBC NEWS, Sept. 15, 2006, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5347876.stm.
4. Rushdie Title ‘May Spark Attacks’, BBC NEWS, June 18, 2007, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6763119.stm.
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concerns.5 Despite attempts to cultivate a more nuanced understanding of
these phenomena, they continue to be illustrated in broad strokes that
reduce any discussion to a confrontation between competing values
backed by different camps with increasingly entrenched positions.
In response to the flare-up over the dog cartoon, the Swedish government immediately moved to ease tensions by expressing “regret” and
meeting with relevant foreign diplomats and other concerned groups.6
While this prompt action seems to indicate that the Swedish government
learned something from the Danish government’s diplomatic failures a
year earlier, the articulation of the underlying issues remains muddled.
As a spokeswoman for the Swedish Foreign Ministry stated, “[w]e can’t
apologise for the cartoons because we did not publish them.”7 She noted
that the government could not influence the publication of such cartoons
because of rules concerning media freedom in the country,8 echoing the
Danish government’s response to the earlier controversy.9
The Human Rights Council has adopted a very different, but equally
unsatisfactory, approach. On March 30, 2007, during its fourth Regular
Session, the council adopted a resolution condemning “religious defamation” as a human rights violation.10 In contrast to the Scandinavian government’s elevation of the freedom of expression, the approach manifested in this instrument is the primacy of religious conviction resonating
within the freedom of religion.
The two positions, both purportedly rooted in a system of theoretically
universal values, seem diametrically opposed, thus raising at least the
specter of incoherence and, more seriously, an outright rejection of the
notion of common humanity. Yet a closer examination of the relevant
rules of human rights law reveals that neither of these extreme positions
flows naturally from the wellspring of fundamental human rights. Although the corpus of international human rights law is far from a perfect
5. Beheaded Prophet Opera Dropped, BBC NEWS, Sept. 26, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/5382554.stm. The opera was ultimately rescheduled and performed a few months later. George Jahn, Berlin Opera Re-Stages
‘Idomeneo’, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/18/AR2006121800917.html.
6. Sweden ‘Regrets’ Prophet Cartoon, BBC NEWS, Aug. 31, 2007, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6972093.stm.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Danish Firm Seeks Muslim Row End, BBC NEWS, Jan. 28, 2006, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4656664.stm.
10. United Nations [U.N.] Human Rights Council, Report to the General Assembly on
the Fourth Session of the Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 4/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/123
(Mar. 30, 2007) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Resolution].
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system, it provides a framework for articulating the full range of underlying issues. Ultimately, such examination can lead to a more satisfactory
spectrum of responses to the problems that have arisen.
I. BEYOND ABSTENTION: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
EXPRESSION
International human rights law imposes an array of obligations on
states in relation to the expression of individuals and groups. The norms
constituting this array range from obligations of abstention, requiring the
state to refrain from interfering with the freedom of expression, to positive obligations, including the obligation to criminally punish certain
types of expression.11
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)12
and the principal regional human rights treaties13 all require state parties
to protect freedom of expression. Article 19(2) of the ICCPR proclaims
that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”14 At the same
time, these treaties contain limitation clauses, recognizing the right of the
state to impose restrictions on that freedom.15 The jurisprudence of human rights bodies has distinguished various types of expression, providing different levels of protection for each.16

11. All of the rules discussed in this Section have their basis in human rights treaties,
though some may have also acquired the status of customary law. The resulting framework of rules, drawing as it does from a number of separately negotiated treaties, is not
necessarily coherent. Human rights bodies, conscious of this issue, have attempted to
harmonize the different treaty regimes. See, e.g., Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 22 (1994) (“Denmark’s obligations under Article 10 (art. 10) must be interpreted, to the extent possible, so as to be reconcilable with its obligations under the UN
Convention.”).
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.19, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
13. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]; American Convention
on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 9(2), June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter ACHPR].
14. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 19(2).
15. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 10(2); ACHR, supra note 13, art. 13(2); ACHPR, supra note 13, art. 9(2).
16. See, e.g., Feldek v. Slovakia, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 87, 106; Otto-Preminger
Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17–18 (1994); Thorgeirson v. Iceland,
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However, human rights law also contains rules requiring the suppression of expression. As opposed to the limitation clauses indicated above,
which permit, but do not require, state parties to limit the freedom of expression, rules such as those set forth in article 20 of the ICCPR impose
obligations to prohibit certain types of expression.17 Article 20 requires
parties to “prohibit[] by law,” inter alia, “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence . . . .”18 Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”) requires parties to “condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or
ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and
discrimination in any form.”19 In particular, it obliges parties to criminalize “dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement
to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or
ethnic origin,” as well as participation in “propaganda activities, which
promote and incite racial discrimination.”20 One particular type of expression has been singled out for the strongest suppression obligation.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (“Genocide Convention”) obliges all states to criminalize,
prosecute, and punish the international crime of incitement to genocide.21
In light of this spectrum of obligations relating to expression, it goes
without saying that compliance with human rights standards in this arena
cannot be reduced to obligations of abstention. At a minimum, states
cannot claim that human rights law constitutes an impenetrable barrier to
the regulation of expression.
While the examples surveyed in the Introduction to this Article would
not constitute incitement to genocide, they may implicate other human

239 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1992); Muller v. Switzerland, 133 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 19 (1988).
17. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 20.
18. Id.
19. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 4, Dec. 12, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD].
20. Id.
21. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 3,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has held that the rules enshrined in the Genocide
Convention have acquired the status of customary international law, binding all states.
Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28).
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rights standards, such as the freedom of religion and the principle of
nondiscrimination.
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER
HUMAN RIGHTS
As noted above, each treaty that sets forth the freedom of expression
also contains a limitation clause. For example, article 19(3) of the ICCPR
expressly permits parties to impose restrictions on the exercise of the
right to freedom of expression.22 However, article 19(3) also limits the
type and scope of permissible restriction. In order to be valid under article 19(3), a given restriction must be “provided by law” and must be
“necessary” to achieve certain purposes.23 These purposes include respecting “the rights or reputations of others” and “the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or
morals.”24 The principal regional human rights treaties contain analogous
provisions.25
Human rights bodies mandated to oversee compliance with these treaties have grappled with a number of cases in which states have suppressed expression deemed to be discriminatory, blasphemous, or otherwise offensive to a religious community. In some cases the suppression
was found to violate the freedom of expression, in other cases the suppression was deemed a permissible limitation, and in at least one case,
the expression was held to be ineligible for protection under the relevant
treaty.
A. The Human Rights Committee
The Human Rights Committee, the treaty-body mandated to monitor
implementation of the ICCPR, has issued general comments on articles
19 and 20, elaborating its views on the content of the obligations set forth
therein.26 In its General Comment No. 11, the committee noted that the
article 20 obligations to prohibit certain forms of expression “are fully
compatible with the right of freedom of expression as contained in article
19, the exercise of which carries with it special duties and responsibilities.”27 The committee also opined that states should enact a law “making
22. ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 19(3).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 13 and authorities cited therein.
26. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 11: Prohibition of Propaganda for
War and Inciting National, Racial or Religious Hatred (Arts. 19–20) at 12, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (July 29, 1983).
27. Id. art. 20.
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it clear that propaganda and advocacy as described therein are contrary to
public policy and providing for an appropriate sanction in case of violation.”28 The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee in individual
cases has provided further insight into its view of the interaction between
the freedom of expression and the rights of others.29
Early on, the committee found that certain types of expression may be
removed from the ambit of protection provided by article 19 by the operation of article 20. In the case of J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada,
the committee found a criminal prosecution for hate speech to be compatible with the ICCPR.30 It opined that the petitioner’s public dissemination of anti-Semitic views fell within article 20 and was thus ineligible
for protection under article 19.31 While the committee’s views in this
case give some indication of the limits of article 19, its brief analysis offers little guidance on the relationship between the freedom of expression
and the obligation to prevent discrimination.
A decade later, the committee had the opportunity to consider this issue in greater depth in the context of a Holocaust denial case. In Faurisson v. France, the complainant alleged that his conviction under French
law for contesting the existence of the Holocaust constituted a violation
of his freedom of expression.32 In concluding that the ICCPR had not
been violated, the Human Rights Committee considered a number of factors, including the broader social context in which the expression was
made.33 The committee noted, in particular, the statement of the French
government that “characterized the denial of the existence of the Holocaust as the principal vehicle for anti-Semitism.” 34As such, the prosecution was justified as “necessary” within the meaning of article 19(3).35
28. Id.
29. The jurisprudence of the committee takes the form of “views” expressed in response to petitions from individuals alleging violations of the ICCPR by State parties to
its first Optional Protocol (“OP”). See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights art. 5, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302.
30. J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada, ¶ 8(b), U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/18/D/104/1981 (declared inadmissible Apr. 6, 1983).
31. Id. The committee’s failure to test this restriction of expression against the requirements of art. 19(3) was criticized by commentators. See, e.g., MANFRED NOWAK,
U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 367–36 (N.P.
Engel 1993). In recent years, the practice of the Human Rights Committee has been to
consider any state interference with expression as a potential violation of freedom of
expression, and thus to examine the restriction under article 19(3).
32. Faurisson v. France, ¶ 2.1, U.N. Human Rights Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/
D/550/1993 (1996).
33. Id. ¶ 9.6.
34. Id. ¶ 9.7.
35. Id.
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In both cases, the committee found restrictions on the freedom of expression to be compatible with the ICCPR because they were directed
toward protecting a group from discrimination. The committee also demonstrated, in the context of the Faurisson case, the importance of considering the broader context in which the relevant expression was made.
The importance of this contextual factor is similarly reflected in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
B. The European Court of Human Rights
Of all international human rights mechanisms, the institutions established under the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”)36 have produced the most
extensive freedom of expression jurisprudence. Although the European
Convention formally applies only to Council of Europe Member States,37
its provisions closely resemble the provisions of the ICCPR. Thus, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, as authoritative interpretations of comparable provisions by an international judicial body, provide
persuasive guidance in the interpretation of the ICCPR and may also
contribute to the development of customary law standards.38
Article 10 of the ECHR closely resembles article 19 of the ICCPR. Article 10 expressly provides for the right to freedom of expression, and
then qualifies this right with a limitation clause.39 Unlike the ICCPR,
however, the ECHR contains no provision expressly requiring state parties to prohibit certain types of expression. Nonetheless, it does contain a
provision that has been interpreted to exclude certain types of expression
from protection. Article 17 of the ECHR states:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for
in the Convention. 40

Although rarely invoked as an express basis for justifying interference
with freedom of expression, the court has acknowledged that, pursuant to
article 17, remarks directed against the ECHR’s underlying values “could
36. ECHR, supra note 13. The ECHR entered into force in 1953 and serves as a supranational system for the protection of human rights in Europe.
37. Id. art 1.
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 102–103 (1987) (the
judgments and opinions of international judicial tribunals as to the meaning of international agreements are accorded substantial weight).
39. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 10(2).
40. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 17.
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not be allowed to enjoy the protection afforded under Article 10.”41 In
particular, it has held that “there is a ‘category of clearly established
historical facts—such as the Holocaust—whose negation or revision
would be removed from the protection of Article 10 by Article 17.’”42
In Garaudy v. France, the court rejected as inadmissible the applicant’s claim that his prosecution for Holocaust denial violated article 10
of the ECHR.43 The court found that the applicant, in the book upon
which his prosecution was based, “systematically denied the crimes
against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis against the Jewish
community.”44 The court found that “in accordance with Article 17 of the
Convention,”45 such expression was ineligible for protection under article
10, and it dispensed with its usual analysis under article 10’s limitation
clause. 46
Nonetheless, in excluding Holocaust denial from the protection of the
ECHR, the court relied on many of the factors that would typically be
employed in such an analysis. It noted that Holocaust denial was one of
the most serious forms of incitement to hatred of Jewish people, that it
infringes the rights of others, and that it constitutes a serious threat to
public order.47 In any event, the court has only exceptionally adopted this
41. See Lehideux & Isorni v. France, 92 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2864, 2886 (1998) (citation
omitted). The court stated that “there is no doubt that, like any other remark directed
against the Convention’s underlying values, the justification of a pro-Nazi policy could
not be allowed to enjoy the protection afforded by Article 10.” Id. See also Eur. Consult.
Ass., Recommendation No. R. (97) 20 of the Comm. of Ministers, Principle 4 (Oct. 30,
1997). This recommendation states that:
National law and practice should bear in mind that specific instances of hate
speech may be so insulting to individuals or groups as not to enjoy the level of
protection afforded by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights to other forms of protection. This is the case where hate speech is aimed
at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention or at
their limitation to a greater extent than provided therein.
Id.
42. Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 369, 396 (quoting Lehideux & Isorni,
92 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2884).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 397.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court stated that:
Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of
racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or
rewriting of this type of historical fact undermines the values on which the fight
against racism and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a serious threat to
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approach of excluding expression from the protection of the ECHR. Indeed, this appears to be the only case in which the court has relied on
article 17 in its ratio decidendi for rejecting a freedom of expression
claim. This is likely a consequence of the unique significance of the
Holocaust in European history and is thus part of the broader social context against which the limits of free expression in Europe are tested.
This exceptional use of article 17 must also be viewed against the
backdrop of the otherwise lofty status the court accords to article 10. The
court has consistently held that “freedom of expression, as secured in
paragraph 1 of Article 10, constitutes one of the essential foundations of
a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and
for each individual’s self-fulfilment.”48 It has further found that, subject
to the limitations of article 10(2), this freedom is “applicable not only to
‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock
or disturb.”49 Therefore, the offensive character of a given expression
cannot itself justify suppression unless it can be subsumed under one of
the grounds for limitation set forth in article 10(2).50
Thus, apart from the example of Holocaust denial mentioned above,
the court analyzes restrictions on virtually any other type of expression
for compliance with article 10’s limitation clause.51 Article 10(2) states:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of
others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confi-

public order. Such acts are incompatible with democracy and human rights because they infringe the rights of others. Their proponents indisputably have designs that fall into the category of aims prohibited by Article 17 of the Convention.
Id.
48. Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1986).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 18.
51. For example, even in cases where the expression at issue was deemed by the court
to amount to an “appeal to bloody revenge,” the court did not apply article 17 of the
European Convention, but instead analyzed the restriction under article 10(2). See Surek
v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355, 382.
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dence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.52

In considering applications alleging a breach of article 10, the court has
developed a standard framework of analysis. The court ascertains
whether there has been an interference with the article 10(1) freedom of
expression. It has found that virtually any prohibition or punishment of
expression constitutes an interference with the freedom of expression.53
Once the court finds such interference, it applies a three-part test under
article 10(2) to determine whether the interference is permissible. In order to be in compliance with the Convention, the interference must be
prescribed by law, for one of the enumerated aims, and necessary in a
democratic society.54 In applying this test, the court affords national authorities a margin of appreciation (i.e., the scope of discretion left to the
state).55 However, that margin of appreciation has not prevented the court
from making a full assessment of all of the facts.56 The court must still
satisfy itself, in light of those facts, that the reasons proffered for the restriction are relevant and sufficient to confirm the existence of a pressing
social need, corresponding to one of the listed aims, and to demonstrate
that the interference is required to meet and is proportionate to that
need.57
Apart from the very narrow category of expression to which article 17
has been applied, no categorical line is drawn between types of expression that will or will not be protected from interference by national authorities. The court examines the content of the expression in its broader
context, including both the form in which it appears and the local situation to which it pertains.58 In so doing, the court examines a number of
factors, including the nature of the expression, the position of the

52. ECHR, supra note 13, art. 10(2).
53. See, e.g., Surek v. Turkey (No. 1), 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355; Jersild v. Denmark,
298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
54. See Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20;
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26.
55. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21;
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25.
56. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23;
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25.
57. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23;
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25.
58. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23;
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25.
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speaker, the target of any criticism, the intended audience, the type of
publication in which it appears, and the nature of the interference.59
Where the expression implicates the role of the press as public watchdog, is political, or concerns a matter of public interest, the margin of
appreciation is narrowed.60 When the expression at issue incites violence,
the authorities will be granted a wider margin of appreciation, indicating
a greater deference to the judgment of national authorities and effectively
lessening the degree of international protection afforded the expression.61
III. THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
As noted above, one of the aims pursuant to which restrictions on freedom of expression may be imposed is the protection of the rights of others. The rights most directly implicated by the types of expression at issue in the relevant controversies described above are freedom from discrimination and freedom of religion.
A. Freedom from Discrimination
In Jersild v. Denmark, the Danish government interfered with a journalist’s freedom of expression by prosecuting and convicting him for
disseminating the racist expressions of others in a television documentary.62 While recognizing that this interference pursued the legitimate
aim of protecting the rights of others, the European Court of Human
Rights found that criminal prosecution was not “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve that aim, and it thus constituted a violation of
article 10 of the ECHR.63
The Danish Prime Minister may have had this case in mind in early
2006 when he responded to outrage over the Mohammed cartoons by
reaffirming Denmark’s commitment to a free press.64 However, there are
a number of important distinctions between the Jersild case and the Danish cartoon controversy.
In the course of its analysis in Jersild, the court emphasized several
key factors: the fact that the applicant was functioning in his capacity as
a journalist, the context in which the statements were broadcast, and the
59. Surek, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24–25;
Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25.
60. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22.
61. See generally Surek v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 353.
62. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15.
63. Id. at 26.
64. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Prime Minister of Denmark, Press Conference Opening
Statement (Feb. 7, 2006), http://www.stm.dk/ (follow “taler” or “speeches” hyperlink in
the left column).
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purpose of the documentary.65 With regard to the applicant’s role as a
member of the press, the court recalled the importance of a free press in a
democratic society and noted that “[a] significant feature of the present
case is that the applicant did not make the objectionable statements himself but assisted in their dissemination in his capacity of television journalist responsible for a news programme . . . .”66 In examining the context in which the news program was broadcast, the court disagreed with
the finding of the Danish courts that there had been no “attempt to counterbalance the extremist views expressed.”67 The court noted that “the
TV presenter’s introduction and the applicant’s conduct during the interviews clearly dissociated him from the persons interviewed,” that Jersild
had “rebutted some of the racist statements” made, and that, “taken as a
whole, the filmed portrait surely conveyed the meaning that the racist
statements were part of a generally anti-social attitude” on the part of the
extremists.68
The court ultimately found that the program, viewed as a whole,
could not objectively have appeared to have as its purpose the propagation of racist views and ideas. On the contrary, it clearly sought—by
means of an interview—to expose, analyse and explain this particular
group of youths, limited and frustrated by their social situation, with
criminal records and violent attitudes, thus dealing with specific aspects
of a matter that already then was of great public concern.69

In relying on the facts that the news item at issue did not have as its
purpose the promotion of racial discrimination and that Jersild had provided a degree of balance to the racist statements made—statements that
the court noted would be unprotected by article 1070—the court left open
the possibility that governmental restraints may be justifiably imposed
when the press simply acts as a mouthpiece for the dissemination of racist views.71

65. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 25. See also Lagoutte, supra note 2, at 398.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 24.
70. Jersild, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (dictum indicating that the scope of expression to which the court is prepared to apply article 17 may not be limited to the singular case of Holocaust denial).
71. The court emphasized that it was “particularly conscious of the vital importance
of combating racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations” and affirmed that
its interpretation was not incompatible with Denmark’s obligations under the CERD. Id.
at 22.
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B. Freedom of Religion
The European Court of Human Rights has also had the opportunity to
examine freedom of expression in relation to religious freedom. The
court has described the latter freedom in similarly lofty terms, finding the
freedom of religion to be not only “one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society,’” but also “one of the most vital elements that go to make
up the identity of believers and their conception of life.”72
There are a variety of ways in which freedom of expression and freedom of religion may interact. A state might enact laws that permit, prohibit, or require expression that conflicts with religious tenets or that creates an environment that otherwise inhibits religious practices. In Kokkinakis v. Greece, the court held that a state may legitimately consider it
necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct,
including the imparting of information and ideas judged incompatible
with respect for the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion of others.73
However, much of the court’s jurisprudence on the interaction of these
rights has centered on the “protection of religious feelings,” which the
court has found to be a component of the freedom of religion.74 The court
has invoked the aim of protecting religious feelings in a string of cases
concerning blasphemy laws.
In Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, handed down the day after Jersild, the court found no violation in the forfeiture and seizure of a film
that the Austrian government deemed to be “an attack on the Christian
religion.”75 The court found the seizure to be “necessary in a democratic
society” to achieve, inter alia, the legitimate aim of protecting the rights
of others.76 It interpreted the latter as including “the right of citizens not
to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views
of other persons.”77
At the same time, however, the court made clear that the protection of
religious feelings could not be invoked to justify a ban on all criticism of
religion. It stated:
Those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest their religion, irrespective of whether they do so as members of a religious majority or

72. Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17–18 (1994).
73. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1993).
74. See, e.g., Otto-Preminger Institut, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17–18; Wingrove
v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937, 1957.
75. Otto-Preminger Institut, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20.
76. Id. at 20–21.
77. Id. at 18.
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a minority, cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism.
They must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious
beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their
faith.78

In the subsequent case of Wingrove v. The United Kingdom, the court
again invoked the protection of religious feelings as justifying what
amounted to a total ban of a video containing content deemed blasphemous under relevant British law.79 The British authorities had determined
that the video, which portrayed sexual conduct between individuals revered in Christianity, would “outrage the feelings of Christians, who
would reasonably look upon it as being contemptuous” of fundamental
religious tenets.80
The court noted that the purpose of the restriction was to protect
against the contemptuous treatment of a religious subject that was bound
to “outrage” Christians and that this goal “undoubtedly corresponds to
that of the protection of ‘the rights of others.’”81 It concluded this was
“fully consonant with the aim of the protections afforded . . . to religious
freedom.”82
In assessing whether the ban was “necessary in a democratic society,”
the court began by noting that “a wider margin of appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion,” indicating the
broad discretion it would afford the state in this matter.83 The court reasoned that
State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements with regard to the rights of others as well as on the “necessity” of
a “restriction” intended to protect from such material those whose
deepest feelings and convictions would be seriously offended.84

However, the court also made clear that there remained limits to that
discretion, and that European supervision was “all the more necessary
given the breadth and open-endedness of the notion of blasphemy and
the risks of arbitrary or excessive interferences with freedom of expres78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 17–18.
Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1960.
Id. at 1947–49.
Id. at 1955.
Id.
Id. at 1958.
Id. at 1957–58.
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sion under the guise of action taken against allegedly blasphemous material.”85 In ultimately finding the ban justified, the court relied on several
factors that may indicate limits on the state’s discretion: whether it was a
total prohibition, whether it was content neutral, and whether there were
safeguards against its arbitrary application.86
In applying these criteria to the facts of the case before it, the court
emphasized that the relevant domestic law did not “prohibit the expression, in any form, of views hostile to the Christian religion.”87 The law
sought only to control the manner in which the views were advocated, as
opposed to the content of the views themselves.88 Further, the primary
“safeguard against arbitrariness” identified by the court was the “high
degree of profanation that must be attained” in order for expression to
constitute blasphemy.89 The court noted that the extent of insult to religious feelings must be significant, referring to the domestic courts’ use
“of the adjectives ‘contemptuous’, ‘reviling’, ‘scurrilous’, [and] ‘ludicrous’ to depict material of a sufficient degree of offensiveness.”90
The court adopted a similar approach in the more recent case I.A. v.
Turkey, in which it found a criminal prosecution for blasphemy to be
consistent with article 10.91 In particular, the court found that Turkey was
justified in imposing a fine on the author of a book for his “abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam,”92 noting that believers might legitimately
have felt themselves “to be the object of unwarranted and offensive attacks” by some of the book’s passages.93
In each of these cases, the European Court of Human Rights found the
suppression of expression justified in order to protect the religious freedom of others. In particular, the states had imposed restrictions directed
toward the protection of the religious feelings of adherents to the majority religion in each state. To the extent that these restrictions are
grounded in the protection of the rights of others, as opposed to, for ex-

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1958.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. I.A. v. Turkey, App. No. 42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=786558&portal=hbkm&source=
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2007).
92. Id. ¶ 29.
93. Id.
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ample, the prevention of disorder,94 they would seem even more justified
for the protection of religious minorities, who are generally more vulnerable.
The jurisprudence of the court makes clear that the freedom of expression cannot be invoked to allow the creation or perpetuation of a discriminatory environment or one that inhibits the exercise of freedom of
religion. At the same time, its tendency to find blasphemy laws consistent with the ECHR indicates that the court may have lost its sense of the
balance between these freedoms. Indeed, at times it seems as though the
court is permitting the suppression of expression without any showing
that the rights of others were actually or even potentially infringed. For
example, in the cases described above, the court did not endeavor to
demonstrate a clear link between the protection of religious feelings and
the exercise of freedom of religion—a link that may be particularly tenuous when the feelings of a dominant majority are at issue.
Restrictions on expression serve human rights principles when they are
applied to protect a vulnerable group from discrimination or to protect
the ability of its members to practice their religion. Blasphemy laws that
serve only to prevent expression deemed offensive by a majority population are less defensible. From a human rights perspective, this is one of
the fundamental problems with blasphemy laws; they tend to focus on
protection of the group’s feelings, and as such are concerned with how
that group may respond to the expression at issue. The more important
inquiry for the purposes of human rights law is how the expression affects the attitude of others vis-à-vis that group.95 Does it incite discrimination against members of that group? Does it create a social environment in which members of that group are unable to practice their religion? Indeed, some of the court’s more recent judgments indicate that the
court may be backing away from the level of protection accorded to religious feelings in the absence of some more tangible interference with
religious freedom.96 The Human Rights Council, on the other hand,
94. The prevention of disorder has also been invoked as a justification for suppression
of expression under blasphemy laws. Indeed, in Otto-Preminger, the court noted that
“[i]n seizing the film, the Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region.” Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 20–21 (1994).
This approach, however, seems to disserve human rights by enabling the anger of the
majority to limit the rights of a minority.
95. Distinguish the mere depiction of Mohammed, which is liable to offend some
Muslims, from the depiction of Mohammed in a manner that incites discrimination
against Muslims, e.g., by inviting the viewer to associate Islam with terrorism and Muslims with violence.
96. See Gieniwski v. France, App. No. 64016/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=791924&portal=hbkm&source=
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seems to have picked up where the European Court of Human Rights left
off and has taken the protection of religious feelings a step further.
IV. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL APPROACH—COMBATING
DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS
Since its creation in the spring of 2006, the Human Rights Council has
taken a keen interest in the issue of defamation of religions. During its
inaugural session in June 2006, the council requested that two of its Special Rapporteurs report on the issue at its next session.97 The decision to
request the report was taken against the backdrop of the Danish cartoon
controversy and was led by council members that are also members of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (“OIC”).98 The decision was
opposed by twelve members of the Council who, as a group, were predominantly representatives of Western countries.99
A similar voting pattern was evident in March 2007 when the council
adopted Resolution 4/9 on “Combating Defamation of Religions.”100
This resolution was introduced by Pakistan on behalf of the OIC.101 The
resolution conceives of defamation of religions as a lynchpin human
rights issue. Its preamble “[n]ot[es] with concern that defamation of religions is among the causes of social disharmony and leads to violations
of human rights.”102
While many of its provisions are couched in general terms applicable
to all religions, the resolution focuses primarily on defamation of Islam.
Thus, in an apparent reference to the Danish cartoon controversy, the
council “deplores the use of the print, audio-visual and electronic media,
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last visited
May 14, 2008) (conviction for religious defamation found to violate article 10); Klein v.
Slovakia, App. No. 72208/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?action=html&documentId=809920&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumb
er&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last visited May 14, 2008)
(conviction for religious defamation found to violate article 10).
97. See U.N. Human Rights Council Decision 1/107, Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/1/107 (Nov. 13,
2006) [hereinafter Human Rights Council Decision].
98. Id. See also Organization of the Islamic Conference, www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/
member_states.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
99. Human Rights Council Decision, supra note 97.
100. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 10. On the voting pattern, see U.N.
Human Rights Council, Summary Record of the 31st Meeting ¶ 73, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/SR.31 (Sept. 21, 2007) [hereinafter Human Rights Council 31st Meeting]. See
also U.N. Human Rights Council, Summary Record of the 24th Meeting ¶ 41, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/1/SR.24 (July 18 2006).
101. Human Rights Council 31st Meeting, supra note 100, ¶ 60.
102. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 10, pmbl.
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including the Internet, and any other means to incite acts of violence,
xenophobia or related intolerance and discrimination towards Islam or
any other religion.”103 Similarly, the council expressed “deep concern at
attempts to identify Islam with terrorism, violence and human rights violations”104 and noted with “deep concern the intensification of the campaign of defamation of religions, and the ethnic and religious profiling of
Muslim minorities, in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September
2001.”105 It also requested the United Nations (“U.N.”) Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance “report on all manifestations of defamation of religions and in particular on the serious implications of Islamophobia on the enjoyment of all rights.”106
The council’s singular preoccupation with Islamophobia becomes more
acute in light of the fact that efforts to include protection of other specifically identified religions were blocked by supporters of the resolution. At
the same time, the singling out of a particular religion for special attention is not necessarily problematic to the extent it is necessary to address
issues particular to that religion.107
Far more problematic is the resolution’s overall tendency to conceive
of defamation of religions as a human rights violation or as a discrete
evil on par with human rights violations. Certainly some expressions that
could be characterized as religious defamation could also constitute human rights violations, but not so every defamatory expression. A human
rights issue arises when the expression incites discrimination against
members of that religion or when it otherwise interferes with their religious freedom.108 It is not the mere fact that the expression is defamatory
that makes it a human rights issue.
The fact that religious defamation is not itself a human rights issue is
implicit in the way in which the resolution recalls the freedom of expression. In paragraph 10, the council:
Emphasizes that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which
should be exercised with responsibility and may therefore be subject to
limitations as provided by law and necessary for respect of the rights or

103. Id. ¶ 11. See also id. ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, and 12.
104. Id. ¶ 2.
105. Id. ¶ 3.
106. Id. ¶12.
107. The international law of nondiscrimination recognizes that special positive measures are at times required in order to ensure substantive equality. See, e.g., CERD, supra
note 19, arts. 1(4), 2(2).
108. See supra Section III.B.
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reputations of others, protection of national security or of public order,
public health or morals and respect for religions and beliefs.109

Significantly, “respect for religion and beliefs” is included as an additional aim pursuant to which restrictions on the freedom of expression
may be justified.110 This language does not appear in the limitation
clauses of any human rights treaties.111 The fact that it is listed separately
from the “rights or reputations of others” implies that it could serve as an
independent basis for limiting the freedom of expression.112
The inclusion of this phrase is troubling because it could be read to license broad-based and wide-ranging blasphemy laws. By including the
aim of respect for religion and beliefs without a nexus to types of expression that in fact infringe upon the rights of others, the resolution opens
the door to proscriptions encompassing any criticism of religion. This
interpretation is all the more feasible in light of the final preambular
paragraph, in which the Council “[n]ot[es] with deep concern the increasing trend in recent years of statements attacking religions, Islam and
Muslims in particular, in human rights forums,”113 and it is all the more
threatening to a proper understanding of freedom of expression in countries where the power of the state is closely tied to religious authority.
CONCLUSION
The battle lines are still being drawn. Tehran holds a conference that
focuses on questioning the existence of the Holocaust114 and the U.N.
General Assembly, in a resolution introduced by the United States,
“[c]ondemns without any reservation any denial of the Holocaust.”115 In
the September 2007 session of the Human Rights Council, Pakistan
warned against revision of the Human Rights Committee’s General
Comment on article 20, fearing that Western influence in the committee

109. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 10, ¶ 10 (emphasis in original).
110. Id.
111. It should also be noted that in paragraph 7, the council “[u]rges States to take
resolute action to prohibit the dissemination, including through political institutions and
organizations, of racist and xenophobic ideas and material aimed at any religion or its
followers that constitute incitement to racial and religious hatred, hostility or violence,”
in language that sweeps more broadly than article 20(2) of the ICCPR. See id. ¶ 7;
ICCPR, supra note 12, art. 20(2).
112. Id. ¶ 10.
113. Human Rights Council Resolution, supra note 10, pmbl.
114. Holocaust Meeting Stirs Passions, BBC NEWS, Dec. 13, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6175353.stm.
115. G.A. Res. 61/255 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/255 (Jan. 26, 2007).
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would lead to a narrowing of the types of expression required to be suppressed.116
In early 2008, after Danish authorities uncovered a plot to kill the illustrator of one of the more controversial cartoons, newspapers throughout
Denmark reprinted the cartoons, citing as justification the defense of the
freedom of expression.117 At the same time, a member of the Dutch parliament released a controversial film associating recent terrorist violence
with Islam.118 These developments fueled a divisive debate in the March
2008 session of the Human Rights Council, which led to a modification
of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.119
The draft of this resolution, initially introduced by Canada, renewed the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur.120 Over the protest of the Canadian
delegate, as well as objections by a number of other, mostly Western,
countries that had initially sponsored the resolution, the mandate was
amended to include reporting on “instances where the abuse of the right
of freedom of expression constitutes an act of racial or religious discrimination.”121 Decrying the amendment as seriously undermining the

116. U.N. Human Rights Council, Summary Record of the 3rd Meeting ¶ 39, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/6/SR.3 (Sept. 25, 2007).
117. Danish Cartoons ‘Plotters’ Held, BBC NEWS, Feb. 12, 2008, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7240481.stm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
118. Dutch MP Posts Islam Film on Web, BBC NEWS, Mar. 27, 2008, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7317506.stm (last visited Apr. 7, 2008).
119. U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development ¶¶ 4(a)–(e), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.24 (Mar. 20, 2008).
120. Id.
121. U.N. Human Rights Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights,
Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development ¶ 4C-bis, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/L.39 (Mar. 20, 2008). Council members voting in
favor of the Egyptian amendment were: Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cameroon,
China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Indonesia, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia,
Mali, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, the Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Zambia. Those voting against were:
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Italy,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United
Kingdom and Uruguay. Bolivia, Japan, and South Korea abstained. After the adopion of
the Egyptian amendment, Cuba then introduced an oral amendment that would insert
language recognizing "the importance for all forms of media to repeat and to deliver information in a fair and [im]partial manner" into the preambular text of the resolution.
This amendment too was adopted despite the no-votes of Canada and fourteen other
council members. Press Release, United Nations, Human Rights Council Extends Mandates on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Racism and Racial Discrimination, Somalia and Myanmar (Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huri-
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mandate's focus, a number of countries, led by Canada, withdrew their
sponsorship of the resolution and abstained from the vote to renew the
mandate.122
These recent events reflect the continued entrenchment of both sides of
the debate;123 neither of these extreme positions capture the complexity
of the underlying issues. Human rights law provides a framework that
can accommodate this complexity.
In assessing the permissibility of restrictions on the freedom of expression, it is essential to consider the relevant context. In light of the prevalence of discrimination against Muslims in many Western countries, invocation of the right to freedom of expression in response to dissemination of material likely to further incite discrimination loses something of
its legitimacy and, indeed, its legality.124 While criminal sanctions may
be unwarranted, there are a variety of other means that may be employed
by states, including simple condemnation of the expression, explicit attempts to counter the message so disseminated, or the provision of civil
remedies.
At the same time, it is important to maintain the grounding of the human rights framework in human rights principles. For example, the scope
of protection of freedom of expression, while justifiably limited by the
human rights of others, should not turn on the propensity for hostility of
those offended by the expression. The latter is even less justifiable when
the offended group represents a majority population.
Of even greater concern is the attempt by the Human Rights Council to
rhetorically link religious defamation to human rights violations while at
the same time asserting the former as an independent basis for justifiably
restricting freedom of expression. At its most nefarious, the resolution
cane.nsf/view01/D6AAED437FC007C1C125741A0071E9CB?opendocument (last visited Apr. 7, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release].
122. U.N. Press Release, supra note 121.
123. See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text (discussing the Swedish government’s invocation of the freedom of expression and the Human Rights Council’s condemnation of religious defamation as a human rights violation).
124. The position of a Muslim in Denmark vis-à-vis the Mohammed cartoons differs
significantly from that of a Muslim in Morocco. See Ben El Mahi v. Denmark, App.
No. 5853/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?
action=html&documetId=812270&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F
69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). This decision
rejected on jurisdictional grounds the application of a Moroccan national living in Morocco who alleged that Denmark violated the Convention by allowing the Mohammad
cartoons to be published. Id. While the issue of defining minority status in an increasingly
globalized world is coextensively complex, the situation of the offended Moroccan remains somewhat less sympathetic.
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could be interpreted to enable states to suppress criticism of the exercise
of power by a dominant religious majority wholly in the name of defending human rights.
There are, of course, innumerable political factors that have influenced
the decision to create a battle. The purpose of this Article is merely to
illustrate that this battle results neither from any inadequacy in the
framework of international human rights law nor from fundamental disagreement over the values underlying human rights law.

